TEHRAN – Gaza appears to be entering a difficult testing phase, the outcome of which will depend on the Palestinians’ ability to forge a unified national position.

U.S. efforts are accelerating to move into the second phase of President Donald Trump’s plan, within what is described as the “day after” arrangements for the genocidal war on Gaza. 

A broad conference was held in Qatar with the participation of around thirty countries, dedicated to discussing the structure and mandate of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) for the Strip. 

Preparations are also underway for an anticipated meeting at the level of chiefs of staff of the countries expected to contribute to this force. A bilateral meeting is also being arranged for the end of December between U.S. President Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu, which is expected to be pivotal in shaping the details of the transition to the plan’s second phase.

Amid these developments, the Zionist regime continues to insist on the disarmament of Palestinian resistance forces as a central objective of the second phase and a core task of the International Stabilization Force. This approach places the Israeli regime’s security at the top of the agenda while ignoring the roots of its heinous aggression and occupation. 

Such insistence has pushed the issue of disarmament to the heart of Palestinian and international debate, turning it into a real test of the genocidal war’s outcomes and of the political and security order that is intended to be imposed on Gaza.

The disarmament of Palestinian resistance forces, foremost among them Hamas, is one of the most sensitive and complex issues in the post-genocide phase. It is not merely a technical or security matter, but a deeply layered issue where political, military, and symbolic dimensions intersect. 

Humanitarian and livelihood pressures are closely intertwined with Palestinian national constants. For a large segment of Palestinians, weapons are not viewed solely as tools of combat, but as part of the identity of a people living under a brutal occupation and exercising their legitimate right to resist it.

The clear rejection by Hamas and other resistance movements over the principle of disarmament becomes understandable, especially when it is presented within security arrangements whose primary aim is to guarantee the Israeli regime’s security, or when it is framed within a U.S.-led vision backed by claims of “international legitimacy.”

The resistance factions see this path as an attempt to strip the Palestinian people of a fundamental right to struggle against occupation and to transform Gaza into an entity deprived of agency and the ability to defend itself, thereby entrenching Israel’s dominance and undermining any future possibility of a real deterrence balance.

At the same time, Hamas cannot be said to be oblivious to the complexity of the current political moment or to the sensitivity of Gaza’s conditions following a genocide that has exhausted society and infrastructure alike. 

A notable shift has emerged in the movement’s position: the issue of disarmament has been referred to a comprehensive Palestinian dialogue, on the grounds that it is a national issue that transcends any single faction. 

This approach reflects Hamas’s desire to share the political cost of decision-making and to avoid bearing sole responsibility for existential choices. It also opens the door to more centrist approaches that may partially intersect with regional and international demands without compromising the core principle of the right to resistance.

Within this internal Palestinian debate, and with the support of regional and international mediators, compromise ideas may be floated that fall short of full disarmament. 

These could include freezing the use of weapons for a specified period without surrendering them; placing part of the offensive arsenal under the supervision or custody of guarantor parties while retaining defensive weapons inside the Strip; or linking the future of weapons to the outcomes of a political process rather than treating disarmament as a precondition. 

While these proposals are limited, they could provide mediators with room to maneuver, helping to advance negotiations while preserving a minimum Palestinian position that rejects relinquishing the right to resistance.

However, transforming the U.S. plan into an international framework through a UN Security Council resolution would place Palestinian factions at a decisive crossroads, which can be reduced to two main scenarios.

The first scenario is Palestinian rejection of the resolution. This rejection could take two forms. The first is military confrontation against international forces or structures emerging from the resolution, which would be viewed as a form of foreign occupation. 

This option carries serious risks, most notably the loss of the international sympathy Palestinians gained amid the genocide, and the reinforcement of the Israeli regime’s narrative that portrays the resistance as a “terrorist” movement confronting the international community. 

Moreover, any violent collapse of the resolution could return the situation to square one and open the door to a new Israeli genocidal war on Gaza, this time with international cover and UN legitimacy, a scenario Tel Aviv has sought from the outset.

The second path within rejection is political confrontation: shaping a unified Palestinian position and a political and popular strategy aimed at influencing implementation mechanisms and indirectly amending certain provisions of the resolution. 

This option is less costly and more realistic, particularly if the Palestinian vision aligns with the interests of regional mediators and sponsoring states, which have little desire for military confrontation with the Palestinian people or their resistance forces, nor for recreating the spectacle of an open war in Gaza.

The second main scenario is acceptance of the international resolution as a transitional phase, despite the painful concessions it entails. Supporters of this option see it as an opportunity to end the genocidal war definitively, open the path to reconstruction, prevent the fragmentation of Gaza, and secure guarantees from mediators that the Zionist regime will not obstruct or circumvent the agreement’s implementation. 

So far, the positions of the resistance movements, particularly Hamas, indicate a preference for the rejection scenario. What remains unclear is the form this rejection will take: a high-risk military confrontation, or a flexible political struggle aimed at reshaping implementation dynamics without sliding into a direct clash with the international community. 

This question is closely tied to Gaza’s dire humanitarian and economic reality, and to the readiness of the popular base to bear the cost of new choices after a devastating genocidal war. 

Gaza appears to be on the brink of a difficult test. Its outcome will depend on the Palestinian ability to articulate a unified national stance and on the capacity of regional mediators to curb the U.S. momentum toward solutions that serve the Israeli regime’s interests alone. 

The broader Palestinian objective remains stabilizing the situation, preventing a return to the genocidal war, opening the door to reconstruction, and reshaping a reality that allows Gazans to live in safety, free from the constant threat of displacement or political and security collapse.

The future of disarmament in Gaza is unlikely to be decided by an international resolution or military pressure alone. Rather, it will be shaped by a delicate balance between Palestinian national constants, regional and international realities, and the ability of Palestinian actors to manage this phase with the fewest possible losses and the greatest possible strategic gains.